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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In addition to the considerations discussed, particularly those
relating to taxation, there are additional tax questions raised.
Unfortunately these are without the intended scope of this note,
and perhaps warrant individual treatment themselves.
In view of the well-known Ellerbe and Gray cases, it would
seem that the law on this phase of mineral rights was fairly well
settled. The instant decision is important as it relates to the
particular facts involved. More important, probably, is the effect
it may have on connected areas of law.
William C. Bradley
PROCEDURE-APPELLATE JURISDICTION, COURT OF APPEAL
Plaintiff brought suit to recover $25,025 for personal injuries
allegedly sustained from an assault and battery and from certain
defamatory statements. The district court rendered judgment
for defendant on the assault and battery charge and for the
plaintiff on the slander charge, and both appealed. Held, that
although slander is an offense separate and distinct from assault
and battery, since the former arose "out of the same circum-
stances" as the physical injuries, the court of appeal had appellate
jurisdiction over both claims for damages. The cases of Newsom
v. Starns and Applewhite v. New Orleans Great Northern Rail-
way Company were expressly overruled. Cavalier v. Original
Club Forrest, 56 So. 2d 147 (La. 1952).'
Article VII, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921
provides, "the Louisiana Supreme Court has appellate jurisdic-
tion in civil suits where the amount in dispute, or the fund to
be distributed, irrespective of the amount therein claimed, shall
exceed $2000 exclusive of interest, except in suits for damages
for physical injuries to or for the death of a person, or for other
damages sustained by such persons, or his heirs or representa-
1. The problem presented in the principal case arises only when separate
and distinct causes of action are joined in the same suit, and is attributable
primarily to the freedom of cumulation of actions permitted under Louisiana
procedure. Cf. Arts. 148-152, La. Code of Practice of 1870. If the two claims
are merely separate items of damages claimed for the same cause of action,
of necessity these separate items would arise "out of the same circum-
stances," that is, claim for property damage to plaintiff's automobile and a
claim for damages for physical injuries to plaintiff, resulting from the same
negligent acts of defendant. In such cases, clearly the appeal would lie to
the court of appeal.
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tives, arising out of the same circumstances." 2 (Italics supplied.)
In interpreting this article the courts have held in suits in which
the claims exceeded $2000 that the court of appeal had noi juris-
diction over an action for libel or slander,3 a suit for false impris-
onment, 4 mental anguish,5 or malicious prosecution, 6 since there
was no claim for damages for physical injuries presented. In
Spearman v. Toye Brothers Auto & Taxicab Company7 plaintiff
brought suit to recover $15,000 for mental anguish and pain suf-
fered when an employee of the defendant company "squeezed
her thigh." The supreme court, in accepting jurisdiction, held
that in order for the court of appeal to have jurisdiction there
must be present actual physical injury, and not merely an emo-
tional injury arising out of a situation which might on occasion
involve physical injury. In Jumonville v. Frey's Incorporated"
the court had occasion to interpret "arising out of the same cir-
cumstances." The case involved a suit in which the greater por-
tion of the plaintiff's claim was based on mental anguish, but
there was also included a claim for physical injuries caused by
this mental anguish. The court held that jurisdiction rested
with the court of appeal, because they felt that the framers of
the Constitution meant to give the court of appeal jurisdiction
over all cases involving claims for physical injury, even though
there might be present mental anguish, humiliation, or the like,
if the latter were caused by the same facts which caused the
physical injury.
The result of the Cavalier case, under its specific facts, appears
to be sound. However, the propriety of the court's express over-
ruling of the Newsom and Applewhite cases appears question-
able. In Newsom v. Starns9 an action was brought to recover
$20,000 for physical injuries received from the kidnapping, tar-
ring, and feathering of the plaintiff by the defendants. Plaintiff
also, claimed an additional $20,000 for the defamation of his good
name caused by the general publication of the news of the tar-
ring and feathering, and a special publication of defamatory
2. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 29, provides that the court of appeal has
appellate jurisdiction over all appealable civil cases in which the supreme
court is not given jurisdiction.
3. Moore v. O'Hara, 8 So. 2d 130 (La. App. 1942).
4. Barfield v. Marron, 17 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 1944).
5. Duplantis v. Chauvin, 158 So. 653 (La. App. 1935).
6. Clarke v. Bandelin, 6 La. App. 564 (1927).
7. 164 La. 677, 144 So. 591 (1927).
8. 171 So. 590 (La. App. 1937).
9. 174 La. 955, 142 So. 138 (1932).
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claims that plaintiff had had intimate relations with the defen-
dant's wife. The facts show that the defendants forced plaintiff
to enter their car, removed him to a place outside of town, and
there tarred and feathered him. Following this, they again forced
the plaintiff into their car and returned to the business district
of Amite, where they forcefully ejected him from the car into
the street. The supreme court held that the court of appeal
undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the suit for personal injury but
that it had no jurisdiction over the claim for defamation, as two
separate and distinct causes of action were involved.
In Applewhite v. New Orleans Great Northern Railway
Company'0 suit was instituted to recover $4,750 for damages
caused by an assault and battery and malicious prosecution.
There defendant's special agent shot the plaintiff while he was
allegedly attempting to enter a box car. After being wounded,
the plaintiff withdrew from the railroad yard and found tempo-
rary refuge in the railroad station, where he was given permission
to lie down. Some time later he was found there by the special
agent who had wounded him, and who then proceeded to have
him arrested by the local authorities. Under these facts, and
under authority of the Newsom case, the court of appeal held
that plaintiff's suit involved two separate and distinct causes of
action, and that it had appellate jurisdiction to review only the
demand for damages for the assault and battery."
It is submitted that these two cases may be distinguished on
their facts from the Cavalier case. In the principal case the
assault and battery and the defamation seem to have occurred
as parts of a continuous course of events, whereas in the Newsom
and Applewhite cases there appears to have been an appreciable
interval of time between the two events giving rise to the suit.
In the Newsom case this interval is found in the time required to
drive the plaintiff from the place where the assault and battery
took place to the town's business district, where the defamation
occurred. In the Applewhite case the element of time involved
10. 148 So. 261 (La. App. 1933).
11. The same jurisdictional question was involved in Searcy v. Inter-
urban Trans. Co., 179 So. 93 (La. App. 1937), but the matter was sidestepped
when the supreme court reviewed both claims under certiorari. Plaintiff,'
while on defendant's bus, suffered a stroke of apoplexy, which rendered him
helpless. Negligently believing him to be drunk, employees mistreated plain-
tiff while he was in defendant's terminal station, and later caused him to be
arrested for drunkenness. The court of appeal had held on rehearing that
it had jurisdiction over the personal injuries claim, but not the defamation
claim.
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is found in the time separating the shooting, which took place
on the tracks, from the time of the arrest, which occurred in the
station house. In neither of these cases did the court indicate
that the element of time separating the two events was a basis
for its decision, but this factor might well have influenced the
court in finding separate and distinct offenses not arising out of
the same circumstances.
One very obvious effect of the present inflationary spiral
has been the sharp increase in the proportion of civil cases now
going on appeal to the supreme court. In recognition of this the
Louisiana State Law Institute, in its projet of a new state consti-
tution, has proposed an increase of the supreme court's jurisdic-
tional minimum from $2000 to $8000.12 In providing a badly-
needed limitation on the jurisdiction of Louisiana's highest court,
and in affording a more even distribution of appeals among the
four appellate courts, the result of the Cavalier case should
prove desirable. Its overruling of the Newsom and Applewhite
cases, however, leaves some rather difficult questions unan-
swered.13
Ronald Lee Davis, Jr.
PROCEDURE-WAIVABILITY OF JURISDICTION
RATIONE PERSONAE
Plaintiff filed suit in Union Parish against residents of Clai-
borne Parish, who were properly cited therein. A preliminary
12. Projet of Constitution of Louisiana, Louisiana State Law Institute,
Art. VI, § 16(3) (1950).
13. Suppose that under the facts of the principal case there had been
a month's interval of time between the assault and battery and the defama-
tion, but that there was a direct causal connection between the two offenses.
Would the claim for the defamation be deemed to arise "out of the same
circumstances" as the claim for damages for the assault and battery, within
the contemplation of the constitutional provision? If so, then the rationale
of the Cavalier case is causal connexity, rather than any test as to the simul-
taneous or continuous nature of the circumstances upon which the two
causes of action are based. Compare Searcy v. Interurban Transp. Co., 179
So. 93 (La. App. 1937).
Until these and similar questions have been answered, it is recom-
mended that under circumstances similar to the principal case, the, appeal
on both causes of action be prosecuted to the proper court of appeal, which
would clearly have jurisdiction, at least as to the physical injury action.
Then, ,even if the intermediate appellate court held the other action to fall
within the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, the court of appeal
could review the physical injury action and then transfer the balance of the
case to the supreme court, under La. R.S. (1950) 13:4440. Cf. State v. J. Foto
& Bros., 134 La. 153, 63 So. 859 (1913).
